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James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
The provision of reliable economic forecasts has long been one of the princi- 
pal challenges facing economists. This continues to be an important way  in 
which the economics profession contributes to the operation of  business and 
government. The past ten years have seen major advances in computational 
power, data availability, and methods for time-series and econometric analy- 
sis. These technological advances have in turn led to the development of new 
methods for economic forecasting with  sufficient scope to provide  serious 
competition to more traditional structural econometric models and to judg- 
mental forecasts, at least for the primary economic aggregates such real GDP 
and the GDP deflator. 
This volume consists of papers presented at a conference held at the offices 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 3 
and 4  May  1991. The purpose of the conference was to provide a forum for 
discussing and investigating new  methods for economic forecasting and for 
the analysis of business cycles. This conference continues the long-standing 
involvement of  the NBER  with economic forecasting and the leading and 
coincident indicators. Indeed, it  was  in a  1938 NBER Bulletin that NBER 
researchers Arthur Bums and Wesley Mitchell initially proposed their system 
of coincident, leading, and lagging indicators (see Mitchell and Bums [  19381 
1961). Under the guidance of Geoffrey Moore, Victor Zarnowitz, and their 
associates, Bums  and Mitchell’s proposal evolved into the  system of  eco- 
nomic indicators maintained today by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The papers in this volume document several of  the new  macroeconomic 
forecasting techniques and models developed over the past ten years, compare 
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their performance to traditional econometric models, and propose methods for 
forecasting  and time-series  analysis.  The volume  starts with an exhaustive 
study by Victor Zarnowitz and Phillip Braun of the historical performance of 
economic forecasts. The data for their study are the responses to a quarterly 
survey  of  professional  forecasters  conducted  by  the  NBER  in  conjunction 
with the American Statistical Association from 1968 to 1990. The forecasters 
surveyed used mostly traditional econometric models, augmented to various 
degrees  by  individual judgment. Because  these  data constitute  actual  fore- 
casts, they provide a framework for evaluating historical forecast performance 
and for making hypothetical comparisons of actual forecasts to forecasts that 
would have been produced had other techniques been used. 
The traditional focus of economic forecasting has been the forecasting of 
growth rates (in the case of the real GNP, e.g.) or levels (say, in the case of 
interest rates) of  economic variables.  However, nontechnical audiences-the 
business press, politicians, and business people-are  often less interested in 
growth rate forecasts than in answers to simple questions, such as “Are we 
going to be in a recession  next  year?” or, “When will the current recession 
end?” To  address  such questions, the  forecaster  must construct  conditional 
probability distributions of future paths of output or other key variables, a task 
made possible by the recent advances in computational power. The next group 
of  papers (the papers by James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson, Ray C. Fair, 
and Christopher A. Sims) takes advantage of these computational advances to 
study different approaches to forecasting growth rates and discrete events, in 
particular,  to forecasting  whether the economy will be entering a recession. 
The specific  models used  for these  forecasts  are quite different:  Stock and 
Watson use a monthly time-series model based on a range of leading economic 
indicators, Fair uses a structural econometric model, and Sims uses a reduced- 
form Bayesian vector autoregressive (VAR) system. The common element in 
the papers by Stock and Watson and by Fair is the use of  stochastic simulation 
to  produce  probability  forecasts of discrete recessiodexpansion  events.  All 
three papers  study the performance of  their forecasting  systems during the 
1990-91  recession and draw lessons from this experience. 
The third group of papers consists of a pair of empirical studies of historical 
relations  among specific economic time series. A number of  recent  studies 
have found that the spread between the short-term commercial paper rate and 
the rate on matched-maturity  U.S. Treasury bills-the  “paper-bill” spread- 
has had a strong predictive relation to aggregate economic activity. Benjamin 
M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner document this relation, summarize sev- 
eral hypotheses for why this predictive relation exists, and provide empirical 
evidence on the extent to which these hypotheses plausibly explain the power 
of this spread as a leading indicator. 
In their paper,  Francis X. Diebold, Glenn D. Rudebusch, and Daniel E. 
Sichel use the historical  NBER business-cycle  chronology  to document the 
striking differences between prewar and postwar U.S. business-cycle dynam- 3  Introduction 
ics.  Before World War 11,  the probability  of  an expansion  ending increased 
with each additional month, while the probability of a recession ending was 
almost independent  of  duration. After World War 11,  the opposite has been 
true. Diebold  et al. also find that the characterizations  of prewar European 
business-cycle durations are similar to those of the United States. 
The papers  in the final group have substantial  methodological  as well  as 
empirical  components.  Danny  Quah and Thomas J.  Sargent develop tech- 
niques  for analyzing dynamic factor models  in  high-dimensional  systems. 
Previous applications of dynamic factor models have involved fewer than ten 
variables. However, recent computational  advances and improved algorithms 
make it possible to contemplate applications to systems with many more vari- 
ables. In their study, Quah and Sargent find that the dynamics of employment 
in over fifty sectors of the U.S. economy are well explained using only two 
unobservable dynamic factors. 
Clive W.  J.  Granger,  Timo Terasvirta,  and  Heather  Anderson  develop  a 
family of  nonlinear  time-series  models for forecasting  economic  variables. 
They apply their techniques to the possibility of forecasting postwar growth 
in real GNP  using a nonlinear model involving the index of leading indicators. 
What follows is a more detailed summary of the individual papers. 
Historical Performance of Economic Forecasters 
From  1968 to 1990, the NBER and the American  Statistical Association 
(ASA) collaborated in the quarterly collection of quantitative economic fore- 
casts made by professional forecasters in private firms, academic institutions, 
government, and nonprofit organizations  with an interest in economic fore- 
casting. These forecasts covered a broad range of macroeconomic  series, in- 
cluding income, production, consumption, investment,  profits,  government 
purchases,  unemployment, inflation,  and interest rates.  These surveys pro- 
vided a public service by facilitating the comparison of  forecasts and the con- 
struction  of composite forecasts. They also serve a scientific purpose:  after 
twenty-two years of collection, the results from these surveys, along with the 
actual outcomes of  the variables  being  forecast, provide  an opportunity  to 
study historical forecast performance and thereby learn how forecasts can be 
improved. 
In their paper, “Twenty-two Years of  the NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic 
Outlook Surveys:  Aspects and Comparisons of  Forecasting  Performance,” 
Zamowitz and Braun use these data to study the performance of professional 
forecasters over this period. The authors start by discussing the uses and his- 
tory of economic forecasting and by providing a history of forecast appraisals. 
They then describe the content and evolution of the NBER-ASA survey and 
document the construction of the associated data base. 
Zarnowitz and Braun then turn to an extensive analysis of the survey fore- 
casts, leading to several main conclusions. (1) At any point in time, and for 4  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
any  economic variable,  there  is typically  great dispersion  across forecasts, 
which typically increases with the forecast horizon.  (2)  Macroeconomic vari- 
ables differ greatly in the ease with which they are forecast: growth in real 
GNP and consumption were forecast better than inflation, residential invest- 
ment, and changes in business inventories.  (3) Perhaps surprisingly, over this 
period there were no large systematic improvements in forecast accuracy: al- 
though inflation forecast accuracy increased,  the accuracy of real GNP fore- 
casts decreased. (4) Combined forecasts, in the form of group mean forecasts, 
are generally  more accurate than  individual  forecasts. Moreover, the group 
mean forecast  for many variables,  including real output, outperforms time- 
series models, in particular, variants of vector autoregressions, when the com- 
parison is conducted in a simulated “real-time” setting (i.e., when the time- 
series models are estimated, and forecasts constructed, using only those data 
available  contemporaneously  to the  forecasts  made  by  the  survey  partici- 
pants). 
The Prediction of  Recessions and Expansions 
In “A Procedure for Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators: Econ- 
ometric  Issues and Recent Experience,”  Stock and Watson describe  an  ap- 
proach  to forecasting  recessions in the  U.S. economy  that  they  have  been 
using since October 1988 and analyze its out-of-sample performance. Unlike 
the  earlier  literature  in  this  area, which  has focused  on predicting  turning 
points, the problem  here  is posed as one of  forecasting  a discrete  variable 
indicating  whether the economy is in  a recession. Stock  and Watson’s ap- 
proach is to define recessions and expansions as different patterns of economic 
activity so that whether the economy will be in a recession  is equivalent to 
whether  the path of  overall economic activity falls in a recessionary  or  an 
expansionary pattern. With quantitative definitions for these two patterns, the 
probability that the economy is in a recession during a future month can then 
be computed by the stochastic simulation of a model that forecasts future eco- 
nomic activity. 
The  specific  forecasting system  used  for  the  stochastic  simulation  is  a 
reduced-form monthly time-series model, developed in earlier work, based on 
seven leading and four coincident economic indicators. This model was esti- 
mated using data from January  1959 through September 1988. Since then, it 
has been  used  to produce three  indexes  of  overall economic activity on a 
monthly basis: an experimental coincident index (the XCI); an experimental 
leading index (the XLI), which is a forecast of the growth in the XCI over the 
subsequent six months; and an  experimental recession index (the XRI), which 
estimates the probability that the economy will be in a recession six months 
hence. 
These indexes performed well from 1988 through the summer of  1990- 
for example, in June, 1990, the XLI model forecast a 0.4 percent (annual rate) 5  Introduction 
decline in the XCI from June through September when in fact the decline was 
only slightly greater, 0.8 percent. However, the XLI and the XRI failed to 
forecast the  sharp declines of  October and November  1990. Even  so, the 
short-horizon recession probabilities produced by the model performed rela- 
tively well during this episode. After investigating a variety of possible expla- 
nations for the forecast failure,  Stock and Watson  conclude that  the main 
source was the failure of  the individual leading indicators included in  the 
model to forecast the sharp drop in aggregate growth, either individually or 
collectively. In short, the XLI and the XRI relied on financial variables during 
a recession that, unlike the previous three recessions, was not associated with 
a particularly tight monetary policy. 
This poor forecasting record entering the 1990 recession is typical of a wide 
range of economic indicators. Of a broad set of forty-five coincident and lead- 
ing indicators, Stock and Watson find that almost all performed poorly during 
this episode; even the best had large forecast errors by  historical standards, 
and, moreover, they performed relatively poorly in the recessions of the 1970s 
and early 1980s. This in turn suggests that there was only limited room for 
improvement in the performance of the recession forecasts. 
In  “Estimating Event  Probabilities from  Macroeconomic  Models  Using 
Stochastic Simulation,” Fair also considers the problem of forecasting reces- 
sions. In  contrast to Stock and  Watson’s  reduced-form approach based on 
monthly data, Fair studies recession forecasts using his quarterly structural 
econometric model, a nonlinear dynamic simultaneous equation system con- 
sisting of  30  stochastic equations,  98 identities, and  179 estimated coeffi- 
cients. Because his system has exogenous variables, he can study recession 
forecasts that incorporate three different types of uncertainty: uncertainty in 
the future path of the endogenous variables, given future values of the exoge- 
nous variables and the model coefficients; uncertainty in the exogenous vari- 
ables, given the model coefficients; and uncertainty (arising from estimation 
error) about the model coefficients themselves. 
Fair considers business-cycle events defined in terms of real GNP, and he 
examines three alternative discrete events: (1) at least two consecutive quar- 
ters of negative growth in real GNP during the next five quarters; (2) at least 
two quarters of negative real GNP growth during the next five quarters; and 
(3) at least two quarters of the next five having inflation exceeding 7 percent 
at an annual rate. Because the event “two consecutive quarters of negative real 
GNP growth” is a conventional, if sometimes inaccurate, rule-of-thumb defi- 
nition of a recession, the first of these events corresponds to a recession occur- 
ring sometime during the next five quarters. 
On a computational level, Fair’s approach is to draw a set of  exogenous 
variables, disturbances, or coefficients, depending on which of the three types 
of  simulation is being performed,  and to use these to compute a stream of 
forecasts over 199O:I-1991:I.  The fraction of times that the forecast registers 
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Fair’s initial focus is the five quarters 1990:1-1991:1.  Even though his mean 
forecasts predict positive growth in four of the five quarters, the probabilities 
of the two contraction events are rather high: for the full stochastic simulation 
(with  uncertainty  arising from endogenous variables,  exogenous variables, 
and  coefficients),  the probability  of  two consecutive  declines  in  GNP ap- 
proaches 40 percent. 
Fair then turns to the more computationally demanding task of computing a 
sequence of event probabilities  over the period  1954:I-199O:I  and compares 
the event forecasts  produced  by  his  model  to those produced  by  a “naive” 
model, a univariate  autoregression  for GNP.  For each of  the two recession 
events, Fair’s  model  (with endogenous variable and coefficient  uncertainty, 
using future values of  the exogenous variables) outperforms the naive model 
using conventional probability scores. Overall, these results are encouraging 
and suggest pursuing further work using stochastic simulation to predict dis- 
crete events. 
One of the most important advances in forecasting methodology during the 
1980s was the development  and refinement of  small multivariate time-series 
forecasting  models, in particular,  vector autoregressions  (VARs). Since first 
introducing VARs to economists, Christopher Sims and his students have pur- 
sued a research  program  aimed in part at improving  the forecasts made  by 
VARs. A key aspect of this program has been the ongoing production of quar- 
terly  forecasts from a Bayesian  VAR. This model  was originally developed 
and maintained by  Robert Litterman  at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minne- 
apolis.  Sims took over the responsibility  for this model and its forecasts  in 
1987. 
The paper by Sims in this volume-“A  Nine-Variable  Probabilistic Mac- 
roeconomic  Forecasting  Model”-documents  the  current  version  of  this 
model and summarizes the changes that have been made to it over the years. 
Sims then  provides  various  measures  of  the model’s  performance, both  in 
sample and out of  sample. The version of the model currently in use incorpo- 
rates nine variables and can be thought of as a third-generation VAR. Because 
a nine-variable,  five-lag VAR would have a very large number of coefficient 
estimates (forty-five regression coefficients per equation, plus a constant), un- 
restricted estimation of  this system would result in imprecise coefficient esti- 
mates and thus a good chance of poor out-of-sample performance. Sims uses 
Bayesian  techniques  to  restrict  the otherwise large  number  of  parameters. 
Sims has also modified Litterman’s original model to incorporate two devia- 
tions from the standard linear/Gaussian framework, conditional heteroskedas- 
ticity  and nonnormal errors. Also, the  model  has been  modified  to permit 
cointegration among the variables. These modifications and the priors incor- 
porated into the model are documented in Sims’s paper. 
Sims next examines the performance of  his  model.  The early VARs had 
produced good forecasts of real variables, but their forecasts of  inflation were 
substantially  worse  than  forecasts  from  traditional  structural  econometric 7  Introduction 
equations. According to Sims’s evidence, his subsequent model modifications 
improved the inflation forecasts without deteriorating the real forecasts. The 
final evidence examined in Sims’s paper is the performance of  the model in 
the 1990 recession. Like almost all (unadjusted) formal quantitative economic 
models, this VAR  failed to forecast the negative GNP growth in the fourth 
quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 199  1. Sims concludes by exploring the 
lessons of this episode for future work. 
Historical Empirical Studies 
A series  of  recent  papers  has  shown that  the difference  between  interest 
rates on commercial paper and U. S.  Treasury bills-the  “paper-bill spread”- 
has, for the past three decades, exhibited a systematic relation to subsequent 
fluctuations of  real  economic activity.  Friedman  and Kuttner’s paper “Why 
Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity?” documents the 
empirical facts about this spread as a leading economic indicator and studies 
various economic reasons why this spread has such a strong historical fore- 
casting record. 
Friedman and Kuttner start by documenting the value of  this spread as a 
predictor of economic activity.  Commercial  paper represents the unsecured, 
discounted short-term (up to 270 days) liability of either nonfinancial business 
corporations or financial intermediaries. The paper-bill  spread outperforms 
any other interest rate or any monetary aggregate as a predictor of output. In 
contrast to the monetary  aggregates, the  authors argue, this  spread  clearly 
forecasts real rather than nominal economic activity; it predicts nominal mag- 
nitudes only to the extent that nominal  magnitudes  reflect real ones. In his 
discussion of  Friedman and Kuttner’s paper, Ben S. Bernanke presents addi- 
tional evidence concerning the striking predictive performance of this spread 
as a leading economic indicator. 
Friedman and Kuttner turn next to a description of several factors that can 
account for the levels of and changes in the spread. One explanation of  the 
mean level is the difference in tax treatments between commercial paper and 
Treasury bills when the interest is received by entities domiciled in states or 
municipalities with an income tax; the authors calculate that an effective state/ 
municipal tax rate of 8.1 percent would suffice to explain the spread between 
six-month commercial paper and six-month Treasury bills. A second factor in 
the spread is that commercial paper is subject to potential default by private 
obligors, a factor that is exacerbated by the junior standing of  commercial 
paper as unsecured  debt. A third factor underlying this spread is the greater 
liquidity of the Treasury-bill market than the commercial  paper market. Al- 
though  the total  value  of  commercial paper outstanding  in  1989 was  $579 
billion,  as recently as 1960 the volume outstanding was only $6.5 billion. In 
contrast, the U.S. Treasury market has been well developed throughout the 
postwar period, with a total value outstanding of $482 billion in  1990. This 8  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
growth of the commercial paper market during this period, along with legal 
restrictions on the use of commercial paper, raises the possibility that the com- 
mercial  paper market  had  substantially  less liquidity than  the Treasury-bill 
market  for much of  this episode.  To  quantify  these  factors, Friedman  and 
Kuttner  provide  a decomposition of  changes in  the  level of  the paper-bill 
spread among changes in the level of interest rates (as suggested by the tax 
and default arguments), changes in quality as measured by the P2-P1 com- 
mercial paper premium, and residual, unexplained changes. They find that all 
three components are statistically and economically large. 
Having documented these historical relations, Friedman and Kuttner study 
three hypotheses about why this spread predicts aggregate economic activity. 
The first concerns changes in perceptions of default risk: a widening of the 
spread reflects an increasing fear of  a downturn, business failures, and con- 
comitant defaults on debt. The second hypothesis is that the paper-bill spread 
is an indicator of monetary policy. The third hypothesis emphasizes changes 
in borrowers’ cash flows: to the extent that borrowers’ cash flows vary cycli- 
cally, borrowing requirements might rise toward the end of an expansion (be- 
cause of constant costs in the face of declining sales), with the result that the 
increasing spread would reflect an increasing supply of commercial paper and 
an increasing commercial paper rate. When these hypotheses are studied em- 
pirically using a more structural approach based on imperfect substitutability 
between commercial paper and Treasury bills, empirical support is found for 
each of these three hypotheses. 
In “Further Evidence on Business-Cycle Duration Dependence,” Diebold et 
al. use formal statistical techniques to take a new look at an idea found in 
popular discussions of the business cycle: that business cycles exhibit dura- 
tion dependence. That is, the probability that an expansion or a recession will 
end depends on the length of that expansion or recession.  The authors’ pre- 
vious  research  on  duration  dependence  in  the  U.S. business  cycle  found 
evidence of substantial differences between the prewar and the postwar busi- 
ness cycle: during the postwar period, contractions exhibit duration depen- 
dence, but expansions do not, while the opposite is true during the prewar 
period.  This paper extends this  line of  research  to France,  Germany, and 
Great Britain. 
The analysis of duration dependence in business cycles is made difficult by 
the small number of  observations of  recessions  or expansions contained in 
even one century of  data. Thus, techniques for the analysis of duration depen- 
dence appropriate for large samples-the  estimation of nonparametric or sem- 
iparametric hazard models-are  inapplicable here because they require too 
many observations. Instead, Diebold et al. employ a quadratic hazard model 
that is parsimonious yet flexible enough to allow the nonmonotone hazards 
that might be found in business-cycle data. 
The application of this quadratic hazard model to the U.S. business-cycle 
chronology confirms the authors’ earlier findings, obtained using a simpler 9  Introduction 
hazard specification, about the differences between duration dependence dur- 
ing the prewar and postwar periods.  For example, they  find that the hazard 
rate for postwar recessions rises from .07 to .29 over the course of  twelve 
months. 
Their results for France, Germany,  and Great Britain indicate that prewar 
expansions exhibit positive duration dependence in all three countries and that 
in none of the countries do prewar contractions exhibit positive duration de- 
pendence.  There is also evidence for duration dependence in prewar whole 
cycles in these three countries, which the authors attribute to the positive du- 
ration dependence of the expansion phase. Overall, these results are qualita- 
tively the same for the United States, which leads the authors to suggest that, 
during the prewar period, there were substantial similarities across countries 
in business-cycle dynamics. 
Methods for Analyzing Economic Time Series 
Much of the aggregate economic data of primary interest to economic fore- 
casters has disaggregated components.  For example, the U.S.  Bureau of La- 
bor Statistics reports total private employment and employment disaggregated 
by industry. However, the richness provided by these disaggregated data has 
largely  been  ignored in many  recent developments in the area of economic 
forecasting.  From the point of  view  of economic theory, a study of  the co- 
movements of these data might elucidate the extent to which different sectors 
respond to aggregate shocks and might even help identify the number of sepa- 
rate aggregate shocks to the economy.  From the point of  view of  economic 
forecasting, the use of these data might result in better measures of these dif- 
ferent aggregate  shocks, which could in turn be used to improve aggregate 
forecasts. However, the very richness of the data-the  large number of  dis- 
aggregated sectors-has  posed a technical barrier to the simultaneous model- 
ing of these comovements. 
In “A Dynamic Index Model for Large Cross Sections,” Quah and Sargent 
embark  on a project  to model  simultaneously  the comovements of  a large 
number  of  disaggregated  series.  They  examine  dynamic  factor  models,  in 
which the comovements of the series are presumed to arise from a reduced 
number of factors. These factors can affect different series with different lags 
and dynamic specifications. Because of computational limitations, these mod- 
els have in the past been  fit to small systems, for example, with four time 
series. The main technical advance in the paper is the development of proce- 
dures, based on the “EM’ algorithm, for the fitting of these models to a large 
panel of time series. 
In their empirical application, Quah and Sargent examine the comovements 
in U.S. employment in fifty-four industries over the period  1948-89.  Their 
striking finding is that a large fraction of the variation in employment can be 
described  by  two common factors.  Their results demonstrate  that  the con- 10  James H. Stock and Mark W.  Watson 
struction of such large-scale dynamic factor models is both feasible and poten- 
tially valuable both for forecasting and for data description purposes. 
Most statistical analysis of economic times series is done using linear mod- 
els. However, economic theory typically predicts linear relations only as spe- 
cial cases; more often, the processes  are likely to be nonlinear, in the sense 
that optimal forecasts will involve nonlinear rather than linear functions of the 
observed  variables.  In  “Modeling  Nonlinearity  over the  Business  Cycle,” 
Granger et al. outline a family of  nonlinear time-series models and tests that 
might usefully be applied to economic data. Their main focus is on smooth- 
transition regression  models, which allow for regression coefficients to take 
on two values and to shift between these two values in a continuous way. 
The empirical  focus of  their paper is the relation  between  GNP and the 
Department of  Commerce’s index of leading indicators. Their objective is to 
ascertain  whether  a  nonlinear  model  provides  better forecasts of  real  GNP 
than a linear model does, in particular, whether a nonlinear model would have 
predicted the onset of the 1990 recession better than a linear one would have. 
Overall, in this application, the results are mixed: although formal statistical 
tests provide some evidence of nonlinearity, and although the nonlinear model 
provides  quite different forecasts than the linear model,  neither model per- 
formed particularly  well  in the slow-growth period  leading to the recession 
and in the sharp contraction during the autumn of  1990. 
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